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THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 34 OF 2005 ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF A MORTGAGE BOND: SEBOLA V STANDARD BANK OF 
SOUTH AFRICA LTD 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) 
 
MM Fuchs 
1 Introduction 
 
When a mortgagor is in default and the mortgagee wants to enforce the debt, the 
National Credit Act 34 of 20051 may apply. If the mortgagor (who is a protected 
consumer in terms of the NCA) is in default, the mortgagee must deliver a section 
129(1) notice to the consumer thereby drawing the default to the attention of the 
consumer.2 
 
Sections 129(1) and 130(1) of the NCA are of cardinal importance and provide for 
the procedures that should be followed by a credit provider before debt enforcement 
can take place. They provide as follows: 
  
Section 129 Required procedures before debt enforcement 
(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider - 
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and propose 
that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative 
dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the 
intent that the parties resolve any dispute under the agreement or develop and 
agree on a plan to bring the payments under the agreement up to date; and (b) 
subject to section 130 (2), may not commence any legal proceedings to enforce 
the agreement before - (i) first providing notice to the consumer, as 
contemplated in paragraph (a) (ii) meeting any further requirements set out in 
section 130. [My emphasis] 
 
Section 130 Debt procedures in a Court 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a credit provider may approach the court for an 
order to enforce a credit agreement only if, at that time, the consumer is in 
default and has been in default under that credit agreement for at least 20 
                                                 
  Michelle MM Fuchs. LLB (UP). Admitted Attorney, Conveyancer and Notary of the High Court of 
South Africa. Postgraduate Research Assistant, Department of Private Law, UNISA. Email: 
fuchsmm@unisa.ac.za. The author is currently enrolled for a LLM (UNISA) with the title of her 
dissertation Execution measures regarding immovable property in South Africa under the 
supervision of Prof S Scott. 
1  The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter referred to as the NCA). 
2  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [45]; Otto and Otto National 
Credit Act Explained (2013) 111; Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte. 
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business days and - (a)at least 10 business days have elapsed since the credit 
provider delivered a notice to the consumer as contemplated in section 86 (9), 
or section 129 (1), as the case may be; (b) in the case of a notice contemplated 
in section 129 (1), the consumer has- (i) not responded to that notice; or (ii) 
responded to the notice by rejecting the credit provider's proposals; and (c) in 
the case of an instalment agreement, secured loan, or lease, the consumer has 
not surrendered the relevant property to the credit provider as contemplated in 
section 127. [My emphasis] 
 
In the recent Constitutional Court judgment of Sebola v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd3 it was held that before instituting action against a defaulting consumer, a 
credit provider must provide proof to a court that a section 129(1) notice of default 
(i) has been despatched to the consumer's registered address and (ii) that the notice 
reached the appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, thereby coming to 
the attention of the consumer.4 In practice the credit provider must obtain a post-
despatch "track and trace" print-out from the website of the South African Post 
Office.5 
 
The Sebola judgment overturned an earlier interpretation of the section 129(1) 
notice in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd.6  After the Sebola judgment there is a 
heavier burden on a credit provider to ensure that the notice is sent and delivered to 
the defaulting debtor. The credit provider has to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the notice was delivered and came to the attention of the defaulting consumer. 
 
2 The facts of Sebola 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The judgment was handed down on 7 June 2012 in the Constitutional Court by 
Judge Cameron. It concerns an application for leave to appeal against a full bench 
decision of the South Gauteng High Court. Standard Bank obtained default judgment 
against Mr and Mrs Sebola (consumers) after it had instituted action to declare the 
                                                 
3  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC). 
4  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [87]. 
5  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [76]. See further Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 116. 
6  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). 
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Sebolas' immovable property specifically executable.7 An appeal against the 
judgment of a single judge of the same court was dismissed by a full bench of the 
High Court.8 The High Court refused to grant the rescission application prepared by 
the Sebolas in September 2009. Both the single judge and the full bench had to deal 
with the question of whether or not a section 129(1) notice read with section 130 of 
the NCA requires that a defaulting consumer should actually receive the notice.  
 
2.2 Background 
 
Mr and Mrs Sebola signed a mortgage home loan agreement in November 2007 with 
Standard Bank and received a loan of R1 312 000.9 Standard Bank secured the loan 
with a mortgage bond over the Sebolas' home. The Sebolas chose their home 
address in the mortgage home loan agreement for jurisdiction and address purposes 
to which "any legal proceeding" were to be served, and they declared that "letters, 
statements and notices may be delivered" to a post office box in North Riding.10 
 
The Sebolas defaulted on their mortgage home loan agreement in 2009 by falling 
into arrears with their monthly bond payments.11 The Bank sent a notice of default 
as required by section 129(1) of the NCA by registered post to the specified post 
office box in North Riding on 16 March 2009.12 A summons was subsequently issued 
on 25 May 2009 in the South Gauteng High Court for the full outstanding amount of 
R1 156 092,30, including costs and interest.13 The Sheriff confirmed on the return of 
service that the summons had been served on 27 May 2009 by affixing a copy to the 
Sebolas' front door, which was the chosen domicilium.14  
 
The Registrar of the South Gauteng High Court granted default judgment against the 
Sebolas. This was done before the Constitutional Court judgment in Gundwana v 
                                                 
7  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [1]. 
8  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [1]. 
9  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [4]. 
10  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [4]. 
11  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [5]. 
12  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [5]. 
13  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [6]. 
14  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [6]. 
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Steko Development,15 where it was held that judicial oversight is necessary where an 
application is made for a sale in execution of mortgaged property against a 
judgment debtor's primary residence. A court may grant such an order only after all 
the relevant circumstances of the debtor have been taken into consideration.16 The 
default judgment against the Sebolas was granted on 25 September 2009,17 
whereafter a writ of attachment was obtained on 17 November 2009.  It was only at 
this stage that the Sebolas became aware of the judgment against them and applied 
for rescission of the default judgment.18  
 
The Sebolas stated in their application for rescission of the default judgment that 
they had not received the section 129(1) notice or the summons issued by the 
Bank.19  They proved this by attaching a post office "track and trace" record to their 
application that reflected that the notice had been received by the Halfway House 
post office instead of the North Riding post office.20 Therefore the notice was 
delivered to the wrong post office by the postal services and the Sebolas could by no 
means have received the notice. The Sebolas further stated that they could not have 
received the served summons, because their home is situated in a housing 
development where no entry was given to any Sheriff on the day the return of 
service was indicated.21 A single judge dismissed their application.  
 
The Sebolas appealed to the full bench of the South Gauteng High Court.22  The 
appeal was dismissed with costs by the full bench on 11 August 2011. The court 
relied on and held itself bound23 by the decision in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank,24 
where it was held that proof of despatch by the credit provider to the consumer's 
chosen domicillium address is sufficient to comply with the requirements of section 
129(1). Proof that the consumer had received the notice therefore was not required. 
                                                 
15  Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 3 SA 602 (CC). 
16  See Van der Walt and Brits 2012 THRHR 322-329. 
17  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [7]. 
18  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [7]. 
19  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [9]. 
20  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [5]. 
21  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [8]. 
22  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [11]. 
23  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [14]. 
24  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). 
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The Sebolas applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court by submitting 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to accord sufficient weight to constitutional 
principles in light of the NCA's objectives.25 Leave to appeal was granted. 
  
3 The judgment of Sebola 
 
The Sebolas on appeal argued that the Bank had not complied with the notice 
requirements of section 129(1). The Constitutional Court therefore analysed this 
section of the NCA. 
 
A credit agreement can be enforced in court by a credit provider only once the 
requirements of sections 129 and 130 have been adhered to. If a consumer is in 
default and a credit provider wants to enforce the credit agreement, section 
129(1)(a) provides that the default may be drawn to the notice of the consumer in 
writing by the credit provider,26 and section 129(1)(b)(i) provides (subject to section 
130(2)) that a notice must be provided to a consumer, in accordance with section 
129(1)(a) before a credit provider may commence with any legal proceedings to 
enforce the credit agreement. For a number of years there has been uncertainty27 
about the interpretation of section 129, and how it affects the execution procedure 
in the case of a mortgage bond over immovable property. 
 
Before the purpose of a section 129(1) notice can be determined it is important to 
understand the purpose of the NCA. In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales28 
it was held that the NCA must be interpreted with a well-balanced approach. When a 
court interprets any section of the NCA it must do so in a manner that gives effect to 
the objectives of the NCA.29 This Act was implemented (i) to promote  a fair and 
                                                 
25  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [17], [36]. 
26  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [45]. 
27  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [34]. See also Van Heerden and 
Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 256. 
28  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales 2009 3 SA 315 (D) 322B-C. 
29  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 6-7; Otto and Otto National Credit Act 
Explained (2010) 6-7. 
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accessible credit market; (ii) to protect consumers;30 and (iii) to ensure equity in the 
credit market by balancing the respective rights and responsibilities of credit 
providers and consumers.31  
 
The purpose of the NCA is pursued through the "consensual resolution of disputes 
arising from credit agreements".32  A section 129(1) notice plays an essential role in 
achieving this purpose by requiring a credit provider to draw a defaulting consumer's 
attention to the fact that he may pursue the assistance of a "debt counselor, 
alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud"33 with the objective 
of reaching an agreement with the credit provider.34    
 
The important question that had to be determined in Sebola was whether or not a 
credit provider should prove that the section 129(1) notice came to the notice 
(attention) of the consumer.35 Judge Cameron emphasised that section 129(1) 
cannot be interpreted in isolation, but must be read with section 130(1)(a).36 The 
judge referred to three issues which should be considered:  First, a credit provider's 
obligations, on the one hand, and what he is permitted to do, on the other, cannot 
be established without interpreting both provisions.37  Judge Cameron38 explained 
that: 
 
Section 129 prescribes what a credit provider must prove (notice as 
contemplated) before judgment can be obtained, while section 130 sets out how 
this can be proved (by delivery).  
                                                 
30  In Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) 32 appeal judge Maya held that the 
legislator's main objective with the Act was to "protect the consumer from exploitation by credit 
providers by, inter alia, preventing predatory lending practices; to ameliorate the financial harm 
which a consumer may suffer where unable to meet his obligations under a credit agreement 
and generally to achieve equity in the lending market by levelling the playing field between 
parties who do not have equal bargaining power". 
31  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [36]; s 3(d) of the NCA; see 
further Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 8; Otto and Otto National Credit Act 
Explained (2010) 108. 
32  Section 3(h) of the NCA. 
33  Section 3 of the NCA. 
34  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [46]. 
35  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [57]. See further Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 115. 
36  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [52], [56]-[57], [59]. 
37  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [53]. 
38  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [54]. 
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Secondly, both sections require that written "notice" must be given to a consumer, 
but do so in different ways.39 Section 129(1)(a) provides that a credit provider "may" 
"draw the default to the notice of the consumer"40 and section 129(1)(b) provides 
that a credit provider "may not commence legal proceedings" to enforce the credit 
agreement before a notice as contemplated in section 129(1)(a) has been provided 
to the consumer. Section 130(1) provides that 10 business days must pass from the 
time that "the credit provider "delivered" a notice to the consumer as contemplated 
… in section 129(1)" before a credit provider is allowed to commence with court 
proceedings to enforce the credit agreement.41 Section 130(1)(a) explicitly refers 
back to section 129(1).42 The third important issue is that the two sections have 
different focuses but achieve the same end result, namely, the delivery of a notice to 
a defaulting consumer as contemplated in section 129(1). Section 129(1)(a) focuses 
on the defaulting consumer and entitles him to a "notice" with a specific content – 
the credit provider therefore "may" provide him with such a notice. Section 
129(1)(b) obliges the credit provider to give such notice because he "may not" 
commence with proceedings against a defaulting consumer unless this notice has 
been given,43 while section 130(1) places an obligation on the notice-provider to 
"deliver" such a section 129(1) notice.44 Judge Cameron45 gave the following 
substantiation of his conclusion that a credit provider must "deliver" such a notice to 
a consumer: 
 
No means of direct proof lies within the reach of a credit provider who wishes to 
enforce an agreement.  It is for this reason that section 130 imposes on the 
credit provider the obligation to 'deliver' the notice.  
 
Therefore, when a credit provider has given notice to a consumer in terms of section 
129(1), he must provide proof and satisfy a court that this notice was "delivered" to 
the consumer. Judge Cameron46 admitted that determining the meaning of 
                                                 
39  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [54]. 
40  Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA. 
41  Section 130(1)(a) of the NCA. 
42  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [54]. 
43  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [55], [72]. 
44  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [55], [57], [72]. 
45  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [57]. 
46  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [61]. 
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"delivered" in section 130(1)(a) is not an easy task with a clear answer. Neither the 
NCA nor section 130(1)(a) gives a definition of the word "delivered". The court, 
however, found some indications in section 65(1) and 65(2)47 of the NCA, which 
provides as follows: 
 
Section 65 Right to receive documents 
(1) Every document that is required to be delivered to a consumer in terms of 
this Act must be delivered in the prescribed manner, if any. (2) If no method has 
been prescribed for the delivery of a particular document to a consumer, the 
person required to deliver that document must - (a) make the document 
available to the consumer through one or more of the following mechanisms - (i) 
in person at the business premises of the credit provider, or at any other location 
designated by the consumer but at the consumer's expense, or by ordinary mail; 
(ii) by fax; (iii) by email; or (iv) by printable web-page; and (b) deliver it to the 
consumer in the manner chosen by the consumer from the options made 
available in terms of paragraph (a) (National Credit Act 34 of 2005). [My 
emphasis] 
 
Section 65(2) assists in the quest of determining the meaning of "delivered" 
mentioned in section 130(1), because it is applicable in circumstances where "no 
method has been prescribed for the delivery of a particular document to a 
consumer" as in section 130(1).48 Section 65(2) points out that "if no method has 
been prescribed for the delivery of a particular document to a consumer", the 
document must be made "available" to the consumer through one of the 
mechanisms provided in section 65(2)(a) by the person who is obliged to deliver the 
document.49 
 
Although registered mail is not given as one of the modes of delivery in section 
65(2), the Constitutional Court confirmed Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd,50 where it 
was held that section 65(2) also covers delivery per registered mail.51 Appeal judge 
Maya in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd52 pointed out that registered mail is a "more 
                                                 
47  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [63]. See further Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 115-116. 
48  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [66]. 
49  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [67]. 
50  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) 29-30. 
51  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [68]. See also Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 115; Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) 
Regte 256. 
52  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) 30. 
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reliable means" than ordinary mail, since there is no practical way to prove that a 
document sent by ordinary mail has been received by the addressee. The judge 
therefore concluded that the despatch of a section 129(1) notice by registered mail 
to a specified address is required for delivery in terms of section 130(1)(a). Judge 
Cameron53 agreed with this point of view but added that more weight and certainty 
needs to be attached to section 130(1)(a) read in conjunction with section 129(1). 
To comply with the requirements of these sections, more than mere "despatch" of 
the notice is necessary. Bearing in mind the high importance given to a section 
129(1) notice, the judge held that for a section 129(1) notice to be effective, the 
credit provider should take reasonable measures to bring the notice to the attention 
of the consumer. He must therefore present proof that the notice "on a balance of 
probability reached the consumer".54 The judge held that this will normally mean 
that a "credit provider must provide proof that the notice was delivered to the 
correct post office".55  
 
In practical terms this means that a credit provider will have to acquire a post-
despatch "track and trace" print-out from South Africa's Post Office website.56  This 
"track and trace" print-out will enable the credit provider to determine which post 
office received the notice that was sent by registered mail. The credit provider's 
summons or particulars of claim must declare that the notice was delivered to the 
applicable post office and that the notification slip was delivered to the consumer. 
Such a notification slip notifies a consumer that a registered item was received for 
his collection.57 Should a consumer aver that the notification slip sent by the post 
office was not received or was not collected, a court must determine, regardless of 
                                                 
53  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [68], [72]. See further Van 
Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 256. 
54  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [74]-[75]. 
55  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [75]. 
56  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [76]. Judge Cameron anticipated 
that some uncertainty may occur in the lower courts after this judgment, and therefore gave 
useful practical guidelines in [76]-[79], [86]-[87] to credit providers to avoid any uncertainty 
when the increased burden of proof needs to be satisfied. These guidelines will assist a credit 
provider to deliver an effective section 129(1) notice which will comply with the NCA. 
57  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [77]. 
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the credit provider's proven averments, if the consumer's statement could be true, in 
which case the court proceedings must be suspended.58   
 
Applying this interpretation of sections 129(1) and 130(1)(a) to the facts of the case, 
the court found that the Sebolas agreed in their mortgage bond that documents 
could be delivered by normal post to their North Riding post box.59 The Bank 
delivered the notice to the Sebolas' North Riding post office and therefore complied 
with the bond agreement. However, it had a further obligation to prove that the 
notice had been received by the correct post office.60  The Bank was unable to prove 
that the notice reached the relevant post office. Consequently the court rescinded 
the judgment against the Sebolas, and the court proceedings were suspended until 
the Bank corrected its omission.61 Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal 
succeeded. The order of the High Court was set aside and was replaced with the 
following order: "The application for rescission of the default judgment is granted 
with costs".62  
 
4 Conclusion  
 
This very important judgment by Judge Cameron overturned the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd.63 To my mind Rossouw 
followed a more reasonable approach to the section 129(1) notice and provide more 
certainty on the section 129(1) notice requirement.64  It held that if a section 129(1) 
notice is sent per registered post, proof that the notice has reached the correct post 
office (as recorded in the credit agreement by the parties) will be sufficient proof of 
delivery to the consumer and therefore will comply with the requirements of section 
129(1). The Sebola judgment confirms the Rossouw judgment but adds an 
                                                 
58  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [79], [87]. In terms of s 
130(4)(b) the court will be adjourned. 
59  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [80]. 
60  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [81]. 
61  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [81]. 
62  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [89]. 
63  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). 
64  See also Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 285; Eiselen Unpublished 
Bulletin. 
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additional evidentiary requirement, namely that proof needs to be provided that the 
section 129(1) notice (i) has been despatched to the consumer's chosen address and 
(ii) that the notice reached the appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, 
thereby coming to the attention of the consumer.65 The Sebola judgment can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Section 129(1)(a) requires a credit provider, before commencing any legal 
proceedings to enforce a credit agreement, to draw the default to the notice of 
the consumer in writing.  It has been described as a 'gateway' provision, or a 
'new pre-litigation layer to the enforcement process' (Nedbank v National Credit 
Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 8).  Although section 129(1)(a) says the 
credit provider 'may' draw the consumer's default to his or her notice, section 
129(1)(b)(i) precludes the commencement of legal proceedings unless notice is 
first given [sic].  So, in effect, the notice is compulsory (2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 
54). The requirement that a credit provider provide notice in terms of section 
129(1)(a) to the consumer must be understood in conjunction with section 130, 
which requires delivery of the notice. The statute, though giving no clear 
meaning to 'deliver', requires that the credit provider seeking to enforce a credit 
agreement aver and prove that the notice was delivered to the consumer. Where 
the credit provider post [sic] the notice, proof of registered despatch to the 
address of the consumer, together with proof that the notice reached the 
appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, will in the absence of 
contrary indication constitute sufficient proof of delivery.66 [My emphasis] 
 
If a consumer avers that he did not receive a section 129(1) notice, proceedings will 
be stayed and will resume only after the steps that a credit provider should follow 
have been complied with.67 Therefore non-compliance with the requirements of 
section 129(1) notices will not be fatal, but will only delay court proceedings. 
Eiselen68 argues that to enable a credit provider to comply with this heavier onus, all 
section 129(1) notices must be delivered by registered post. I agree with Eiselen and 
should like to add that if delivery by registered post is sanctioned as one of the 
methods of delivery by the consumer, the credit provider should also make an extra 
effort to deliver the notice by ordinary post to the consumer's domicilium address. 
Such a notice will then serve as delivery to a consumer who ignores the notification 
by registered letter. It is clear that compliance with section 129(1) is of the utmost 
                                                 
65  ABSA Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) 50, 53, 55-56, 58. 
66  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [87]. See Otto and Otto National 
Credit Act Explained (2013) 116-117. 
67  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [87]. 
68  Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
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importance. Therefore, when a credit provider increases the probabilities of the 
notice coming to the attention of the consumer, the chances of compliance improve.  
 
Both Eiselen69 and Otto and Otto70 made the following suggestions that will assist a 
credit provider when the requirements of Sebola need to be followed. First, when 
proceedings are stayed due to non-compliance with section 129(1), at least 10 days 
should pass before a credit provider attempts to deliver a notice again. Secondly, 
when proceedings are stayed and a consumer decides to refer the matter to a debt 
counsellor in terms of section 129(1)(a), such proceedings should not resume before 
that procedure has been completed.71 Eiselen72 suggests that a credit provider can 
reduce the increased burden of proof by providing alternative mechanisms for 
delivery of a section 129(1) notice in the credit agreement, such as e-mail or fax.73   
 
A credit provider who declares in his summons or particulars of claim that a section 
129(1) notice was delivered to the consumer is making a very bold assertion. A court 
should therefore first determine if the notice was indeed "delivered" in terms of the 
NCA. A credit provider should specify the method/s of delivery which he followed in 
the summons or particulars of claim to eliminate any speculation about whether or 
not he complied with the requirements of the NCA.74  
 
In commenting on the Sebola judgment both Van Heerden and Coetzee75 and Otto 
and Otto76 come to the conclusion that the Constitutional Court went too far with the 
additional compliance requirement for notice in terms of section 129(1). They state 
that the Sebola judgment does not contribute to legal certainty in this regard. This is 
                                                 
69  Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
70  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 114; Otto and Otto National Credit Act 
Explained (2010) 108-109. 
71  Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
72  Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
73  When a section 129(1) notice is sent by e-mail or fax to the defaulting consumer, the time of 
despatch and delivery can be confirmed by a confirmation e-mail (when sent by e-mail) or print-
out (when sent by fax). 
74  See s 65(1) and (2) of the NCA. 
75  Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 256, 285. 
76  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 117-118. 
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confirmed by the contradictory high court decision in Mkhize.77  In this judgment the 
court held that ordinary mail is more reliable than registered mail, since the 
percentage of registered mail that is returned undelivered is much higher than 
ordinary mail. This view differs from conclusion in Sebola that registered mail is 
more reliable than ordinary mail. The authors agree with the viewpoint in Mkhize 
that held that when a section 129(1) notice was sent with registered post and the 
delivery was unsuccessful due to the consumer not collecting the letter, "there is a 
high degree of probability that the consumer has avoided delivery". Consequently 
the reason why registered mail will more frequently be returned undelivered might 
be the consumer's "avoidance tactic", which places a credit provider in a very 
difficult position. The authors therefore argue that the Constitutional Court in effect 
left a door open for consumers to avoid receipt of the section 129(1) notice, and in 
doing so to circumvent the enforcement of the credit agreement. The additional 
compliance requirement of the Sebola judgment is superfluous and complicates the 
interpretation of the NCA in that it does not take into consideration the well-
balanced approach required when interpreting the act. Otto and Otto argue that this 
additional compliance required by Sebola "will only create more headaches for banks 
and other credit providers". Van Heerden and Coetzee agree with Otto and Otto that 
the section 129(1) notice requirements urgently need to be revised and amended by 
the legislator to obviate a credit provider's reluctance when awarding credit, and to 
minimise  increase in the costs of credit that could arise as a result of the additional 
burden. Such revision would also contribute to legal certainty and avert unnecessary 
evidential headaches. Otto and Otto accept that consumer protection comes at a 
price, but argue that after Sebola this protection is stretched to breaking point. They 
state that the additional burden of proof does not promote an "effective and 
accessible credit market and industry".78  
 
In conclusion, I agree with these authors that the Constitutional Court overreached 
the boundary of compliance with the section 129(1) notice requirements. It seems 
that the Constitutional Court lost sight of the requirement that a balanced approach 
                                                 
77  ABSA Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZN) 34-35, 66. 
78  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 118. See further Van Heerden and Coetzee 
2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 284, 286. 
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must be followed in interpreting the NCA, and tipped the scale in favour of 
defaulting consumers.79 I am of the opinion that when a court interprets the 
requirements for compliance with section 129(1) the interests of both the credit 
provider and the consumer must always be equally balanced on an "imperceptible 
scale" so that both parties might enjoy equal protection from the NCA. The 
interpretation in Sebola places an additional burden of proof on a credit provider and 
will probably increase the cost of credit, which in turn would affect the pockets of 
consumers. Mortgagees who wish to foreclose on their mortgage bonds are 
obviously seriously affected by this interpretation and will possibly also discount the 
cost of the additional burden in their bond costs.  
                                                 
79  See Otto and Otto's statement that a credit provider also has legal interests that are entitled to 
protection in Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 8. 
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